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DOES "LEGISLATIVE REVIEW" BY COURTS IN APPEALS
FROM PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONS CONSTITUTE
DUE PROCESS OF LAW?
MAURICE H. AI

M

*

"In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either
of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial
powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers or either of them, to the end it may be a
government of laws and not of men."-'
Thus did the men of M.assachusetts phrase the classical expression
of the doctrine of the separation of governmental powers among
three departments. Enunciated in various forms in the American
Constitutions and regared as implicit therein when not expressly
set forth, 2 this doctrine has exerted tremendous influence upon our
public law. When conceived to require that every function of the
state shall be tagged as either legislative, executive, or judicial in
nature, assigned to its proper department and thereafter be regarded
as verboten to either of the other two, it has frequently played havoc
with the practical and efficient organization of public affairs. Today
we tend to regard it as requiring no more than a practical division
of labor among governmental bodies based upon considerations of
functional expediency, but there remain traces of the stricter view
in our judicial decisions. 3 This discussion deals with a particular
*See Biographical note p. 271.
1 Massachusetts Constitution (1780) Pt. 1, Sec. 30.
2 See Kilbourn, v. Thompson (1881) 103 U. S. 168, 36 L. Ed. 377; Stat,
v. Johnson (1900) 61 Kan. 803, 60 Pac. 1068, 49 L. R. A. 662: Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Myatt, (1899, Circ. Ct. Kan.) 98 Fed. 335 and cases
there cited.
3
An interesting contrast is presented by the following:
"That the important powers of government differing so widely in their
essential characters might lawfully be vested in a single board or tribunal,
to be exercised upon the life or property of a person, is a startling
proposition, and it would suggest the inquiry whether our plan of government has not insensibly drifted far away from its ancient moorings."
Hook, District Judge, in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Myatt, Note 2, surpa.
"There is much discussion whether rate-fixing is in its nature a 'judicial'
or a 'legislative' function. This was a period in the history of American
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situation, not yet specifically dealt with by the courts, wherein a
strict application of the doctrine of the separation of powers, based
upon a technically logical adherence to past precedents, would produce a particularly unfortunate result.
In accordance with the criterion, attractive, if inaccurate, that
legislation establishes rules for the future while adjudication passes
upon controversies arising under existing rules, 4 the American
courts have, for the most part, held that the fixing of rates to be
charged by a railroad or other public utility for service to be rendered in the future, must be assigned to the legislative compartment
in our threefold classification of governmental power. - Courts may
not, therefore, acting in a judicial capacity, prescribe future rates as
between the utility and its customers. 6 Likewise, rules governing for
the future, the administration of such enterprises and the extent and
character of service to be rendered by them are thought of as falling
within the legislative domain. 7
On the other hand, there are occasions in which the administration of public utilities, the services to be rendered by them and the
rates to be charged therefor present questions whose solution is
recognized by the courts as coming within the proper sphere of judijurisprudence when discussions of this sort were popular. The separation
of powers into executive, legislative, and judicial was looked upon as more
than a mere differentiation of functions based upon practical considerations;
it was thought to be the manifestation of an inherent truth. The pseudophilosophy of the period regarded certain governmental acts as in their
nature judicial, and hence never to be exercised, under the constitution,
by either the legislative or the executive branch." Gerard C. Henderson,
"Railway Valuation and the Courts," 33 Harv. L. Rev. 902, 904.
See also upon this point, Roscoe Pound, "Justice According to Law,"
14 Col. L. Rev. 1, 5.
4"The distinction between a judicial and a legislative Act is well defined.
The one determines what the law is, and what the rights of parties are
with reference to transactions already had; the other prescribes what the
law shall be in future cases arising under it." Dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Field in Sinking Fund Cases, (1879) 99 U. S. 700, 25 L. Ed. 496.
5
Munn v. Illinois (1876) 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77; Reagan v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co:., (1894) 154 U. S. 362, 38 L. Ed. 1014, 14 Sup. Ct. 1047;
McChord v. Louisville & Nashuville R. Co., (1902) 183 U. S. 483, 46 L. Ed.
289, 22 Sup. Ct. 165; Missouri Southern R. Co. v. Public Service Commission,
(1919) 279 Mo. 484, 214 S. W. 379.
6
Hodge v. Alabama Water Co., (1921) 205 Ala. 472, 88 So. 585; City
of Madison v. Madison Gas & Electric Co., (1907) 129 Wis. 249, 108 N. W.
65, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 529. See also cases cited in note to preceding case
in 8 L. R. A. (N. S.)
7
See Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Indiana,
(1911) 221 U. S. 400, 55 L. Ed. 786, Sup. Ct. 537; Wedley Southern R. Co.v.
Georgia, (1915) 235 U. S. 531, 59 L. Ed. 405, 34 Sup. Ct. 214; Appeal of
Norwalk St, Ry. Co. (1897) 69 Conn. 576, 37 Atl. 1080, 38 Atl. 708, 39 L.
R. A. 794; Wabash C. & W. Ry. Ca. v. Commerce Commission, (1923) 309 Ell.
412, 141 N. E. 212; Fishback v. Public Service Commission of Indiana,
(1923) Ind. 138 N. E. 346.

DOES LEGISLATIVE REVIEW

cial activity. A detailed enumeration thereof would be out of place
in this article. One such "judicial function," however,-the power
to pass up the legality and the constitutionality of "legislative"
regulations-gives rise to the problem here considered.
Legislative regulation of public utilities must, under our social
order, be made subject to the constitutional limitations imposed upon
legislative action. When the regulation is made by an administrative body exercising delegated powers, the additional requirement
arises that the action taken be within the grant of power to the regulating agency. That the decision of the question whether a particular rule complies with these requisites is within the judicial competence is now so well settled as virtually to need no citation., But
even in such proceedings fear of passing the bounds appointed as
meet for a judicial action is apparent, and the courts hold that they
may not, in upholding or striking down regulations because of illegal
or unconstitutional characteristics, arrogate to themselves the legislative function of prescribing rules for future observance. "Rate
making is no function of the courts, and should not be attempted,
either directly or indirectly." 9 Hence courts may not establish new
tariffs in the place of those they strike down. 10 There is a similar
refusal to substitute judge-made regulations as to the service to be
rendered for those prescribed by the regulating agencies. 1'
This judicial inquiry into the constitutional infirmities of regulatory measures may not be escaped. As to claims that the particular
requirement infringes the constitutional rights of the utility, ineluding all those rights which have been created by judicial construction of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
courts must be permitted to decide.
Whether the reguation be
- See upon this point Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota (1890)
134 U. S. 418, 33 L. Ed. 970, 10 Sup. Ct. 462; Reagan v. Faimers' L. & T.
Co., Note 5, supra; Denver & S. L. R. Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. (1918)
64 Colo. 229, 171 Pac. 74. See also Ray A. Brown, "The Functions of
Courts and Commissions in Public Utility Rate Regulation," 38 Harv. L.
Rev. 141, 152-158.
9 Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., (1922) 258 U. S. 165, 66 L. Ed. 538,
42 Sup. Ct. 264.
10 See Alton & S. R. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, (1925) 316
Ill. 625, 147 N. E. 417;East Ohio Gas Co. v. City of Cleveland, (1922) 106
Oh. St. 489, 140 N. E. 410. But compare the practice adopted in some
cases of enjoining enforcement of an alleged confiscatory rate upon condition that the plaintiff charge no more than a maximum named in the decree, pending the establishment of another rate by the proper authorities.
See as to this: Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co. Note 9 supra; City
of Toledo Rys. & Light Co., (1919, 6th Circ.) 259 Fed. 450, 170 C. C. A.
426; Augusta-Aiken Ry. & Electric Corporation v. Railroa-1 Commission of

South Carolina, (1922, 4th Circ.) 281 Fed. 977.
11 See Blackledge v. Farmers' Independent Telephone Co., (1921)
Neb. 713, 181 N. W. 709.
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embodied in a statute enacted by the legislature itself 12 or in an
order of an administrative board, 18 "due process" requires that the
state permit those affected a judicial review of its constitutional
phases, a review in which the court shall be permitted to exercise "its
own independent judgment as to both law and facts." 14 If the
regulation is one prescribed by an administrative tribunal, it is not
necessary that the review be afforded by means of an appeal directly
from the administrative proceedings to a reviewing court.16 It is
sufficient if the judicial review may be had upon a proceeding to
enjoin the enforcement of the order, 16 or by contesting its legality in
a prosecution for its violation, providing in the latter instance the
penalties prescribed are not so severe as to deter a contest. 17 But, in
some manner, the review must be accorded.
The cases speak of the requisite review as a "judicial review" ".
We may assume that this means a review by courts, "under the
forms and with the machinery provided by the wisdom of successive
ages for the investigation judicially of the truth of a matter in controversy," 19 that is, acting in the manner in which courts are accustomed to act, and applying the traditional technique of the judiciary 20 to the solution of the problems before them rather than the
rough and ready methods sometimes characteristic of administrative
tribunals. Does it mean more ? Is the conception that the making
of rules for the future is the exclusive attribute of the legislature
so fundamentally embedded in our juristic theory that, if the reviewing court may-as it may in some of our states-substitute its own
order for that of the commission, the review afforded is not a judicial
2
1

Ex parte Young, (1907) 209 U. S. 123, 52 L. Ed. 714, 28 Sup. Ct.
441, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 932, 14 Ann. Cas. 764
13 Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, (1890) 134 U. S. 418, 33 L.
Ed. 970, 10 Sup. Ct. 462.
'4 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, (1920) 253 U. S. 287,
64 L. Ed. 908, 40 Sup. Ct. 527.
15 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Garrett, (1913) 231 U. S. 298, 58 L. Ed. 229,
34 Sup. Ct. 48. See also Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, (1914) 232
U S. 531, 58 L. Ed. 713, 34 Sup. Ct. 359.
16 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Garrett, Note 15, supra.
1.7 Wadley Southern R. Co. v. Georgia, (1915) 235 U. S. 531, 59 L. Ed.
405, 34 Sup. Ct. 214, containing a summary of the ways in which judicial
review may be afforded. That, when the only method of review provided
is to raise the alleged invalidity of the order as a defense to a prosecutioa
for its violation, prescription of such excessive penalties as to deter a contest render the order unconstitutional, see Oklahmam Operating Co. V.
Love, (1920) 252 U. S. 331, 64 L. Ed. 596, 40 Sup. Ct. 338.
Is See Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, Note 14, 8upra, and
cases citef therein.

19Blatchford, J. in Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, note 13,
supra.
20 See Roscoe Pound, "The Theory of Judicial Decision," 36 Harv. L.
Rev. 641, 645, 646, 651.
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one? If such a review is the only one permitted by the laws of the
state, has the utility been denied due process for want of a judicial
review? It is submitted that these questions ought to be answered
in the negative, but there is reason to apprehend that, by process of
abstract reasoning from past decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States, a contrary result may be reached.
The cases in which the Supreme Court of the United States has
had occasion to consider whether a state court, in reviewing the
orders of a public utility commission was acting in a judicial capacity have involved two types of questions: When may a utility resort
to the federal courts to enjoin the enforcement of an order? Is the
decision of a state court sustaining an order on appeal from the
commission res judicata as to the validity of the order?
In Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 21 the Supreme Court was
confronted with the contention that the Corporation Commission of
the State of Virginia was invested with judicial powers and that a
proceeding before it to establish rates was a proceeding in a state
court which the federal courts were by statute forbidden to enjoin. 22
The court denied this contention on the ground that the character of
the proceeding was to be determined by the "nature of the final act"
and that the act of rate making "is the making of a rule for the
future, and therefore is an act legislative in kind." The court then
proceeded to decide that the injunction issued by the Circuit Court
was improvidently granted and that the decree should therefore be
reversed. The reasoning upon which this result was reached may
thus be briefly summarized: The plaintiff railroads had brought
their action in the federal court immediately upon the promulgation
of the commission's order without invoking the appeal to the state
Supreme Court of Appeals vouchsafed them by the state constitution. 23 If upon such an appeal, the state court should reverse the
order of the commission, it was required to "substitute therefor such
order as, in its opinion, the commission should have made at the time
of entering the order appealed from." 24 Therefore said Mr. Justice
Holmes, the state court upon appeal acted in a legislative and not a
judicial capacity. The legislative process was not complete until
the final disposition of the appeal or until the time for appeal had
expired. "Comity" between state and federal authorty requires
that the federal courts should not intervene until the legislative process is complete. Hence the bills "were brought too soon." To the
extent indicated, therefore, the Prentis case holds that a review by
a court having power to substitute its own orders for those of the
21

(1908) 211 U. S. 210, 53 L. Ed. 150, 29 Sup. Ct. 67.

U. S. Rev. Stat. Sec. 720.
2 Va. Const. 1902, Sec. 156.
24 Va. Const. 1902, Sec. 156 (g).
22
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commission is a review by a tribunal exercising powers not judicial,
but legislative.
The doctrine of the Prentis case has been invoked by the Supreme
Court. in several subsequent cases to show that, as the review provided by the several states involved did not permit the state court to
substitute its own order for that of the commission, the review was
judicial, not legislative, in kind, and that, therefore, the application
to the federal courts for protection might properly be made upon
the promulgation of the commission's order, without invoking the
appellate jurisdiction of the state courts. 25 Similar use of this test
may be observed in opinions of the lower federal tribunals. 26 On
the other hand, in holding that, since "Rules of Comity or convenience must give way to constitutional rights," a failure to exhaust
the "legislative" procedure does not bar a resort to the federal
courts when, pending an appeal, suspension of a confiscatory schedule of rates has been denied, 27 or cannot be granted 28, the Supreme
Court has characterized the review by the courts of rate-fixing orders
in Oklahoma 2 9 and of valuation proceedings in Washington 3 0 as
legislative in character.
23

Bacon v. Rutland R. Co., (1914) 232 U. S. 134, 58 L. Ed. 538, 34
Sup. Ct. 283 (Vermont Pub. Stat. 1906, Secs. 4599, 4600). Prendergast v.

New York Telephone Co., (1923) 262 U. S. 43, 67L. Ed. 853, 43 Sup. Ct.
466, referring to New York procedure: "Upon the making by the commission of the orders in question the proceedings had reached the judicial
stage entitling the company to resort to the court for relief. ***Here the

commission is vested with the final legislative authority of the state in the
rate-making process; the authority exercised by the state courts upon a
review by certiorari (citing case) being purely judicial and having no
legislative character (Laws New York 1920, Chap. 925, Secs. 1304, 1305,
pp. 437, 438)." Pacific Telephone & Teleg. Co. v. Kuykendall (1924) 265

U. S.196, 68 L. Ed. 975, 44 Sup. Ct. 553, holding judicial review of ratemaking under Washington statute (Rem. Comp. Stat. 1922. Sec. 10, 428)
to be judicial in character.
26 Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Stevens, (1909, Circ. Ct. N. Y.) 172 Fed.
595; Wilmington City Ry. Co. v. Taylor, (1912, D. Ct. Del.) 198 Fed. 159;
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Hilton, (1921, D. Ct. Minn.) 274 Fed. 384;
Helena Water Co. v. City of Helena, (1921, D. Ct. Ark.) 277 Fed. 66; Van
Wert Gaslight Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, (1924, D. Ct. Oh.) 299
Fed. 671; Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Spillman, (1925, D. Ct. Neb.) 6 F.
(2d) 663. See also Colorado Power Co. v. Haldeman, (1924, D. Ct. Colo.'

295 Fed. 178.
27

Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, (1923) 261 U. S. 290, 67L Ed.

659, 43 Sup. Ct 453.
28
29

Pacific Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. KuykenJlall, note 25, supra.
Oklaho auNatural Gas Co. v. Russell, note 27, supra. The Oklahoma

provision for appeals from rate making orders is a duplicate of that
obtaining in Virginia. Oklahoma Constitution, Art. IX, Sec. 23.
3

oPacific Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Kuykendall, note 25 supra. The sup-

erior court, on writ of review, if it holds the findings of the commission to
be "unjust, incorrect, unreasonable, unlawful, or not supported by the
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In the Prentis case, 31 the court took occasion to say: "If the
rate should be affirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeals and the
railroads still should regard it as confiscatory, it will be understood
from what we have said that they will be at liberty then to renew
their application to the circuit court without fear of being met by a
plea of res jtdicata." In other words, since the review in the state
court is legislative in character, the judgment rendered cannot be
regarded as a binding judicial determination of the legal question
involved. On the other hand, where the state court's function is
restricted to an approval or reversal of the commission's order, with
no power of modification or substitution, the Supreme Court has been
quite willing to accord to its decision, unappealed from, the character
of res judicata. 32
In respect to these two problems--"Comity" and res judicatathe Supreme Court has definitely decided that a review of commission action by a state court having power to substitute an order of
its own making for that of the commission cannot be regarded as a
judicial review. Will it also hold that it does not constitute such a
judicial review as the state is required to vouchsafe the utility under
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ?
A strictly logical extension of the past decisions would seem to
call for such a holding. If due process requires opportunity for
"judicial" review of commission action, and if a review in which
the court may revise the orders of the commission is legislative and
not judicial in character, then it would seem that such a review does
not afford due process. Some such view as this may be indicated by
the language of the learned justice who wrote the majoritey opinion
in the Ben. Avot case when he said, speaking of the law there under
consideration:
"Without doubt the duties of the courts upon appeals under the
act are judicial in character,-not legislative, as in Prentis v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra. This is not disputed; but their
jurisdiction, as ruled by the supreme court, stopped short of what
must plainly be intrusted to some court in order that there may
be due process of law." 33
In other words, the Pennsylvania legislation under fire in that case
might be regarded as affording the requisite judicial review insofar
as it restricted the courts to purely "judicial" functions; its essential
evidence," is to make "new and correct findings." On appeal from the
superior court, the supreme court exercises the same authority. Rem.
Comp. Stat. Wash. 1922, Sec. 10, 441.
31 Note 21, supra.
32
Detroit & Mackinac Ry. Co. v. Michigan. Railroad Commission (1914)
235 U. S.402, 59L. Ed. 288, 35 Sup. Ct. 126; Napa Valley Electric Co. v.
Railroad Commission of California (1920) 251 U. S.366, 64 L. Ed. 310,
40 Sup. Ct. 174.
33McReynolds, J. in Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, note
14, supra.
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vice lay in not giving them a sufficiently free rein in exercising those
functions. There is implicit in the language used the suggestion
that a purely "legislative" review, though given by a court, would
not satisfy the demands of due process. 34 The question thus implicitly raised seems reserved for future consideration by Keller v. Potomao Electric Power Co.35 There the precise point passed upon was
the validity of a congressional act providing for a review of decisions of the public utilities commission of the District of Columbia
by the Supreme Court of the District with the right of appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals of the District and thence to the Supreme Court of the United States. As construed by that tribunal,
the statute gave all these courts the power to substitute orders of
their own for those of the commission. 86 It is said in the opinion
that Congress, because of its plenary power over the District, may
thus confer "legislative" power upon the local courts. On the other
hand, since nonjudicial powers may not be vested in the Supreme
Court of the United States, it was held that the provision for a final
appeal to that body was invalid and the appeal was dismissed for that
reason. A contention seems to have been raised that the statute, by
forbidding other resort to the courts than by the prescribed review,
amounted to a denial of the judicial review equired by due process,
but a decision on this point was denied. 37 It is apparent, therefore,
that the question whether due process is afforded through review of
the commission orders by a court exercising the "legislative" power
of substituting its own order for that appealed from remains open
although a technically logical application of past decisions and dicta
indicates that there is a possibility that a negative answer may be
given when the question is finally passed upon.
But will any useful purpose be served by such a holding? Are
the constitutional rights of the utility any more adequately preserved
through a review by a court which has power only to affirm or to
reverse the order under consideration than they are when the reviewing court is permitted, if it decides that the order is erroneous, to
remould it so as to make it unobjectionable? In both instances the
review is by a tribunal of lawyers, trained in the traditional technique
34 For a similar view, deduced by a state judge from the language of

Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., note 21, supra, see the opinion of the
court per Williams J. in Pionere Telephone & Telegrap. 0oC. v. State,
(1914) 40 Okla. 417, 138 Pac. 1033.
35 (1923) 261 U. S. 428, 67 L. Ed. 731, 43 Sup. Ct. 445.
86 For the statutory provision involved, and for the vigorous expression

by the chief Justice of the view that the powers conferred must be regarded
as legislative in character the reader is referred to the opinion.
87As to this point the Chief Justice says: "Some question has been
made as to the validity of q 65 which forbids all recourse to courts to set
aside, vacate, and amend the orders of the commission after one hundred
and twenty days, and of q169, which puts the burden upon the party

adverse to the commission to show, by clear and satisfactory evidence,
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of the common law; applying to the order, in accordance with this
technique, the judicially imposed and judicially defined content of
due process of law; making such application in the light of its "own
independent judgment as to both law and fact." 38s The insistence
upon judicial review as essential to due process surely means no more
than that the utility shall have all questions affecting the constitutionality of the particular action taken,-perhaps also as to its validity under the statute from whence the commission draws its authority,
-determined by a court, acting in the manner in which courts are
accustomed to act in deciding such questions. 31 If these questions
are considered and decided in accordance with this time-honored
technique, "provided by the wisdom of successive ages for the investigation judicially of the truth of a matter in controversy," 40 by
a court, what difference does it make that the court, after answering
the contention of the utility in the affirmative and after holding the
order to be inoperative because transgressing the constitutional rights
of the utility itself enters an order which does not, in its judgment,
violate those rights? Such an order would be sustained on review
if made by the commission in place of that which was set aside. Are
the inadequacy, unreasonableness, or unlawfulness of the order complained
of. It is suggested that this deprives the public utility of its constitutional right to have the independent judgment of a court on the question
of the confiscatory character of an order, and so brings the whole law
within the inhibition of the case of Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon,
253 U. S. 287, 64 L Ed. 908, 40 Sup. Ct. 527. It is enough to say that,
even if 4 C.,s. 65 and 69 were invalid, the whole act would not fail, in
view of ( 92 (providing that the invalidity of any paragraph or part
thereof shall not affect the validity of the rest of the act) already referred
to. It will be time enough to consider the validity of those sections when
it is sought to apply them to bar or limit an independent judicial proceeding raising the question whether a rate or other requirement of the commission is confiscatory." See 261 U. S. 445, 67 L. Ed 737.
38 In view of the extensive development of "legislative" review under
the Oklahoma constitutional provision heretofore referred to (see note 29,
supra) the reader is referred to the following Oklahoma cases as exemplifying the effective character of the protection afforded by such a review:
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. State (1909) 23 Oklahoma. 510. 101 Pac.
262; T wi Valley Telephone Co. v. Mitchell, (1910) 27 Okla. 388, 113 Pac.
914; Missour, 0. & G. Ry. Co. v. State, (1916) 53 Okla. 341, 156 Pac. 1155;
Oklahoma Natural Gas. Co. v. State, (1923) 90 Okla. 84, 216 Pac. 917;
McAlester Gas & Coke Co. v. State, (1924) 102 Okla. 118, 227 Pac. 83;
Fred Harvey v. Corporation Commission, (1924) 102 Okla. 266, 229 Pac.
428.
39Cf: "The United States Constitution does not require a state to separate judicial from other state functions, but it probably does require a
tribunal fair, unbiased, and reasonably fitted to pass on the matter submitted to it in order that its decisions may be due process, but does the
affixing of the name court add anything to its potentialities?" 3. B.
Cheadle, "Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations," 3 S.W. Pol.
Sci. Quar. 1, 13.
40 See Chicago AM. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minesota note 8, supra.
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rights more adequately protected when the court reverses the order
and remands the case to the commission with an opinion clearly indicating the course which the commission should take 41 than when,
after a careful consideration of the case the court itself enters the
order which it deems proper? 42 To say that in the first ease the
utility receives due process of law which is denied it in the second
ease seems to the writer to exalt form over substance and to ignore
the realities of the situation in favor of a useless mechanical application of the doctrine of the separation of powers. 48
The undesirability of such a subordination of substance to form 44
is accentuated by the fact that there are several very material advantages which are possessed by "legislative" as distinquished from judicial review. In the first place, the entering of a final order by the
reviewing court, possible under a system of "legislative" review
makes for an expedition in the disposal of the controversy not always
possible under review of the other type. 41 Such a speeding up of
41 See for example Blackledge v. Farmers' Independent Telephone Co.,
(1921) 105 Neb. 713, 181 N. W. 709; Public Service Ry. Co. v. Board of
Public Utility Commissioner, (1921) 96 N. J. L. 54, 114 Atl. 323; Ben
Avon Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co., (1921) 75 Pa. Super. Ct. 290,
affirmed, Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co., (1921) 271 Pa. St.

346, 114 Atl. 369, P. U. R. 1921 E. 471. The latter case is the sequel of
the famous Ben Avon case in the Supreme Court of the United States (see
note 14, supra) and presumably affords the utility due process of law.

42 See Oklahom Natural Gas Co. v. Corporation Commission, (1923) 90
Okla. 84, 216 Pac. 917 and Consumers Gas Co. v. Corporation Commission,

(1923) 95 Okla. 57, 224 Pac. 698.
43 Compare the painstaking and thorough attention given the claims of
the utility in such cases as Pioneer Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Westenhaver, (1911) 29 Okla. 429, 118 Pac. 354; McAlester Gas & Coke Co. v.
Corporation Commission, (1924) 102 Okla. 118, 227 Pac. 83; Petersburg
Gas Co. v. City of Petersburg, (1922) 132 Va. 82, 110 S. E. 533 with the

review available in a court exercising solely "judicial" functions.
44 How artificial is the reasoning which would deny to "legislative" review the character of "due process" may be thus illustrated: Since "due
process" is satisfied by the existence of one proper form of judicial review
(see Louisville R. Co. v. Garret, note 15, supra.), a state which had

limited the utility's recourse to a "legislative" rview in the highest state
court might cure this defective (?)procedure by permitting a "judicial"
review through an injunction issuing out of one of the state courts of first
instance.

(See Pioneer Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. State, note 34

supra.) We might then be edified by the spectacle of the supreme court
bf the state, in its appellate "judicial" capacity, reviewing a decree of one
of the inferior courts enjoining an order of the public utility commission
which the supreme court in its "legislative" capacity had theretofore affirmed! Will anyone claim that the essential constitutional rights of the
utility would be made in any way more secure by such a process?
45 Note the following decisions under systems providing for purely
"judicial" review. The Colorado Supreme Cdurt holds itself unable to
enter an order for the division of rates between two carriers, on setting
aside the commission's order, and therefore remands the cause to the commission "for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views herein ex-
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the final determination of regulatory proceedings is desirable alike
from the standpoint of the utilities of the patrons and of the regulatory bodies. 46 If the court must set aside an entire order merely
because one phase thereof cannot be sustained 47, needed relief to the
public is unnecessarily delayed, with no permanent advantage to the
utility. The commission, by subsequent proceedings, may correct its
error. The proper regulation will then be imposed upon the utility.
The same result is finally obtained as if the court had corrected the
order and affirmed it as corrected. The sole substantial difference
between the two processes is the needless delay and added cost imposed by the restricted powers of the court in administering a "judicial" review.
Moreover, a "legislative" review, wherein the court is compelled
to substitute the order which should have been made for the order
which is set aside, requires judges to give to the public side of the
controversies over regulation a consideration which is not demanded
pressed."

Denver & S. L. R. Co. v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., (1918)
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Colo. 229, 171 Pac. 74. In Illinois, "The Circuit Court, in reviewing an
order of the Commerce Commission, has no authority to revise or modify
it," and to do so is error.

Alton & S. R. Co. v. Illinoid Commerce Corn-'

,mission, (1925) 316 Ill. 625, 147 N. E. 417. In Nebraska, when the Railway Commission ordered a physical connection between two telephone systems with a provision that new business should be divided between the two
in a certain proportion, the Supreme CoCurt held the order unexceptionable
except as to the latter provision. Feeling unable as a judicial body to
modify the order by striking out the faulty portion, the court had no
recourse but to reverse the whole order, leaving the parties free to engage
in "further proceedings before the commission for the purpose of arriving
at some reasonable regulation for the exchange of service, under such conditions, if they can be found in this case, as will be legally justifiable and
within constitutional limits." Blackledge v. Farmers' Independent Telephone Co., (1921) 105 Neb. 713, 181 N. W. 709. Cf. Pioneer Telephonie

Co. v. State, (1919) 71 Okla. 305, 177 Pac. 580. Th q Missouri
& Telegraph&
Supreme Court, though convinced that the petitioner before the commission is not entitled to any relief, may not direct the commission to dismiss the proceedings. It can only reverse the order. Chicago B. & Q.
Ry. Co. v. Public Service Commission, (1915) 266 Mo. 333, 181 S. W. 61.
See also Chicago I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission (1911) 175 Ind.

630, 95 N. E. 364. In New Jersey, the Supreme Court found that an
order requiring a railway to maintain flagmen at certain crossings was
proper except that such maintenance should not be required at hours when
no trains were operated over the crossings. HELD, that it was error to
remand the case to the commission with directions to reform the order to
that extent, as **** the order **** should have been set aside in toto,

without directing or ordering the board of public utility commissioners to
either revise or modify the order. What order should be made in lieu of
the one set aside rests exclusively within the jurisdiction of the board of
public utility commissioners."

Erie R. Co. v. Board of Public Utility

Com'rs. (1917) 90 N. J. L. 271, 100 Atl. 346.
40 Cf. Bauer, Effective Regulation of Public Utilities, 45.
47 See Blackledge v. Farmers' Independent Teleplwne Co., note 45, aupra

and other cases cited in that note.
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by a purely "judicial" review. In "judicial" review, the court is
for the most part concerned with the problem whether the regulation

complained of infringes constitutional or legal rights of the persons
subjected thereto. 48 For relief from any mistake which the regulatory body may make in favor of the utilities, the people are referred
to the instrumentalities of political control.49 The doors of the courts
are closed to them. 50 .That it is undesirable to stimulate a feeling
that the courts are available for the relief of the utilities only, would
seem to need no argument. r" The alleged tendency of courts to place
undue emphasis upon private rights at the expense of public interests
has been the ground of much of the criticism directed at judicial
supervision of the order of regulatory bodies. But judicial supervision of some sort we must have. That being so, it seems that much
may be said in favor of a process which makes court review available to both sides to the controversy and which requires judges, in
overturning administrative orders, to give consideration to the public
interests involved and to frame new orders to take their place. Such
a process makes the function of the court something more than merely to "uphold the guaranties which inhibit the taking of private
property for public use" or to "protect the constitutional rights of
Rate making is no function of the
48 "Our concern is with confiscation.
courts; their duty is to inquire concerning results, and uphold the guaranties which inhibit the taking of private property for public use under
any guise." Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. San Francisco, (1924) 265 U. S.
403, 68 L. Ed. 1075, 44 Sup. Ct. 537. "It was not intended that the courts

should interfere with the commission or review its determinations further

than to keep it within the law and protect the constitutional rights of the
public service agencies over which it has been given control." Steamboat
Canal Co. v. Garson, (1919) 43 Nev. 298, 185 Pac. 801. "Rates fixed by
the legislature cannot be interfered with by the courts except for the
purpose of protecting private property from confiscation. If the rates
are fixed sufficiently high to enable the utility to earn a reasonable
return upon the capital invested, there is no ground for judicial interference." City of Eau Claire v. Railroad Commission, (1922)
49"The remedy of the public in case rates are fixed too high is to elect
a legislature that is more considerate of the public interest." City of Eau
Claire v. Railroad Commission, note 41, supra. The undesirability of making the decisions of utility commissions political issues in the manner suggested is manifest.
50 In addition to the case cited in note 48, see Lewistown Borough v.
Public Service Commission, (1923) 80 Pa. Super. Ct. 528; City of Scranton v. Public Service Commission, (1923) 80 Pa. Super. Ct. 549; Salt Lake
City v. Utah Light & Traction Co., (1918) 52 Utah 210, 173 Pac. 556. An
exception must be made in respect to those cases in which it is claimed
that the commission has acted ultra vires. See for example City of Lima
v. Public Utilities Commission, (1919) 100 Oh. St. 416, 126 N. E. 319.
51
For a very striking illustration, in respect to the United States Commerce Court, of the unfortunate effect of making tribunals available for
the relief of but one class of parties to controversies over regulation, see
Felix Frankfurter, "The Business of the Supreme Court of the United
States," part IV, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 587, 608, 611.

DOES LEGISLATIVE REVIEW

the public service agencies." 52 It tends to focus attention more
directly upon the public interest involved in the controversy and to
the fundamental problem of adjusting all the varied interest involved. " To that extent it cuts the ground from under the claim
that the courts are available for the protection of the interests of
the utilities alone.
At any rate, such states as Virginia, 54

Oklahoma, 55

Arizona, 51

Washington,5 7 and Arkansas 8 have seen fit to establish such a review of the orders of their public utility commissions, 59 as to some
or all of the matters under their jurisdiction. Congress has seen fit
to provide for it in the public utility law of the District of Colum52 See note 48, supra.

;3 Compare such cases as St. Louis-S. F. R. Co. v. State, (1921) 81 Okla.
298, 198, Pac. 73 and MeAlester Gas & Coke Co. v. Corporation Cnminis-

sion, note 43, supra, with cases cited in notes 48 and 50, supra.
54 See Constitutional provisions cited in note 23, supra.
55 See Constitutional provisions cited in note 29, supra.
56 Arizona Revised Stat. 1913, Sec. 2343. The Supreme Court of Arizona
does not seem to have passed upon-the duties of the courts under this section but the provision that "judgment shall be rendered affirming, modifying or setting aside such original order," seems clearly to provide for a
"legislative" review. It may be held unconstitutional as in violation of
the dogma of separation of powers, but the Arizona Constitution, Art. XV,
Sec. 17, seems to permit provision for such an appeal.
537
As to valuation orders. Rem. Comp. Stat. Wash. 1922, Secs. 10, 44,
10, 448. The constitutionality of this legislation under the Washington
Constitution seems not to have been passed upon.
S The Arkansas Supreme Court, notwithstanding the pronouncements
of the Supreme Court of the United States, holds that the substitution by
the court of its own order for that set aside in a rate proceeding is the
exercise of judicial and not legislative power. It has said: "A judicial
review necessarily involves a correction of the erroneous judgment else
complete justice would not be accomplished. * * * The same method must
be adopted to ascertain whether the rate is confiscatory or fair and reasonable, and when one is ascertained the other is implied; therefore a
declaration of the conclusion reached is the result of the judicial review
and not the ascertainment of the rate growing out of the exercise of a
legislative function." Coal Dist. Power Co. v. City of Booneville, (1923)
161 Ark. 638, 256 S. W. 871. Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Ft. Smith Spet-

ter Co., (1921) 148 Ark. 260, 230 S. W. 897; St. Louis Southwestern Ry.
Co. v. Stewart, (1922) 150 Ark. 486, 235 S. W. 1003; Van Buren Waterworks v. City of Van Buren, (1922) 152 Ark. 83, 237 S. W. 697; Clear

Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Ft. Smith Spelter Co., (1923) 161 Ark. 12, 255 S.
W. 903. Compare Helen Water Co. v. City of Helena (1921, D. Ct. Ark.)
277 Fed. 66. It seems clear that, so far as the Federal question of due
process is concerned, the powers exercised by the Arkansas courts would
be regarded as legislative, under the principles heretofore discussed. For
statutory provisions involved, see cases cited above.
59In Arkansas, city councils have regulatory jurisdiction over local
utilities and the review provided applies to their regulations as well as
to those of the railroad commission. See cases cited in note 58, supra, and
statutory provisions therein referred to.
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bia.6 ° Since it has met with such substantial approval from constitutional conventions and lawmakers, it is to be hoped that the highest court of the land will not find itself so cosely held "in the grip
of a 'jurisprudence of conceptions' " as to feel required to hold
that it does not constitute "due process of law."
60 See statutory provisions discussed in Keller v. Potomac Power Co.,
note 35, supra.
61 Ray A. Brown, "The Functions of Courts and Commissions in Public
Utility Rate Regulation," 38 Harv. L. Rev. 141.

